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January 22, 1987

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT**

SUBJECT: Southern Africa (C)

**The President has approved the attached National Security Study
Directive on Southern Africa. A copy is forwarded for your
information and action. (S)**

Frank C. Carlucci
Frank C. Carlucci

Attachment

NSSD 3-87

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WASHINGTON

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90039

January 22, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 3-87Southern Africa (C)

The year 1986 saw several significant developments affecting our posture in Southern Africa: the State of Emergency in South Africa; the U.S. sanctions legislation; the death of Samora Machel; U.S. aid to UNITA; the suspension of the 435/CTW negotiations with Angola; and the breakdown of the Nkomati accords. In light of these developments, this directive establishes the terms of reference for an interagency review of our policy with an emphasis on (a) a reexamination of U.S. interests in the region, and (b) possible new approaches which might enhance those interests. (S)

To assist this interagency review, the Director of Central Intelligence is requested to arrange updated community assessments on the following issues with a deadline of February 1, 1987:

- Soviet/Cuban objectives and likely courses of action in the region over the next 24 months;
- the prognosis for the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars over the next 12 months (update of SNIE 72-3-85);
- the evolution of the internal situation in South Africa over the next 12 months (update the SNIE 73-2-85);
- U.S. dependence on strategic minerals in the region, including stockpiling implications, alternate sources of supply, the likelihood of interrupted supply in various contingencies of instability, and relevant scenarios under power sharing or majority rule. (S)

The Interdepartmental Group for Africa, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, should prepare, by February 20, 1987, an options paper for my consideration addressing such issues as the following:

- What are U.S. strategic interests in the region: political, economic, and security?

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-- What are the appropriate objectives and strategies of our involvement in the Black-White problem of South Africa? In particular:

- o Should the U.S. take the lead vis-a-vis other Western countries, or should we maintain a low profile?
- o What should be our posture toward South Africa's central political problem? Our options range from withdrawal, to offering good offices in assisting a dialogue and mediation, to more detailed reform and constitutional proposals with suggested timetables. Would there be benefit for the U.S. in giving more emphasis to promotion of a negotiation and to stating the democratic standards that we would hope to see govern a solution?

- o What are the implications of our evolving relationship with the African National Congress: How do we avoid the weakening of more moderate black groups? How can we influence ANC policies on such issues as violence, Soviet ties, the initiation of negotiations, and a democratic outcome in South Africa?

- o What is the role of the Frontline States and how might we enlist their support for our policy objectives?

- o What overall posture toward the South African Government will maximize our influence over its actions?

- o How do we ensure sufficient bipartisan domestic and Congressional support for a responsible U.S. policy? (S)

-- In Angola, in light of the military assessment outlined in the updated SNIE, what are the implications for the effort to promote an acceptable political solution? Specifically:

- o What U.S. actions could induce the Angolan government and their Soviet/Cuban patrons to seek a political settlement in the next two years rather than wait out this Administration?
- o What new pressures, including economic, should the U.S. bring to bear against the Angolan government?
- o What is the impact of U.S.-South African relations on the Angolan war?

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- o What new pressures could be brought to bear on Cuba and other Soviet proxies engaged in Angola? (S)

-- In addition, a subcommittee of the NSPG, chaired by the NSC Senior Director for Intelligence, is requested to review the program with respect to Angola and to determine if modifications are desirable in light of political-military and diplomatic developments since the program's inception. An analysis and options paper should be prepared for NSPG review by February 13, 1987. (TS)

Richard Reagan

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